9月6日学术报告（中科院计算技术研究所诸葛海

9月6日学术报告（中科院计算技术研究所诸葛海

类别：学术报告发布人：admin 浏览次数：次发布时间：2015-09-06 15:00

报告题目：Online Auctions in IaaS Clouds: Welfare and Profit Maximization with Server Costs

报告日期及时间：9月10日周四16：00-17：00

报告地点： B404

报告人：吴川副教授

报告人单位：香港大学计算机系

报告人简介：Chuan Wu received her B.Engr. and M.Engr. degrees in 2000 and 2002 from the Department of Computer Science and Technology,
Tsinghua University, China, and her Ph.D. degree in 2008 from the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University
of Toronto, Canada. Between 2002 and 2004, She worked in the Information Technology industry in Singapore. Since September 2008,
Chuan Wu has been with the Department of Computer Science at the University of Hong Kong, where she is currently an Associate
Professor. Her research is in the areas of cloud computing, network function virtualisation, and online and mobile social networks.
She is a member of IEEE and ACM, and served as the Chair of the Interest Group on Multimedia services and applications over
Emerging Networks (MEN) of the IEEE Multimedia Communication Technical Committee (MMTC) from 2012 to 2014. She has
also served as TPC members and reviewers for various international conferences and journals, including IEEE INFOCOM,
IEEE ICDCS, ACM MM, TPDS, TON and TMM. She was the co-recipient of the best paper award of HotPOST 2012.

报告摘要：
Auction design has recently been studied for dynamic resource bundling and VM provisioning in IaaS clouds, but is mostly
restricted to the one-shot or offline setting. In this talk, I will discuss a more realistic case of online VM auction design, where: (i) cloudusers bid for resources into the future to assemble customized VMs with desired occupation durations;
(ii) the cloud provider dynamically packs multiple types of resources on heterogeneous physical servers into the requested VMs;
(iii) the operational costs of servers are considered in resource allocation; (iv) both social welfare and the cloud provider’s net
profit are to be maximized over the system running span. I will introduce the truthful, polynomial time, online auctions that we
designed to achieve social welfare maximization and/or the provider’s profit maximization with good competitive ratios. The
mechanisms consist of two main modules: (1) an online primal-dual optimization framework for VM allocation to maximize the social welfare with server costs, and for revealing the payments through the dual variables to guarantee truthfulness; and (2)
a randomized reduction algorithm to convert the social welfare maximizing auctions to ones that provide a maximal expected
} profit for the provider, with competitive ratios comparable to those for social welfare. I will also show the efficacy of the online
auctions based on trace-driven simulation studies.

邀请人：李宗鹏教授黄传河教授

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